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Introduction
Only a small portion of today's existing research has made
use of rigorous empirical methods to convincingly isolate
the impact on the health sector of the new provider-pay-
ment arrangements from those which resulted from other
changes occurring at the same time. Throughout the
1990s and early 2000s, several transitional countries in
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) aimed
at reforming their provider-payment systems in order to
achieve the general objectives of protecting health-spend-
ing levels and improving the overall performance of the
health sector.
We use such reforms as a natural experiment to investi-
gate, empirically, the system-wide impacts of introducing
patient-based (casemix) and fee-for-service methods for
hospital reimbursement (compared to line-item budgets)
on a set of outcomes including hospital-activity rates,
capacity utilization, national-health spending, and mor-
tality amenable to healthcare.
Methods
Using panel data gathered from 28 ECA countries from
1990 to 2004, and controlling for - among other factors -
contemporaneous payment reforms in the primary-care
sector, our three regression-based generalizations of the
difference-in-differences approach seem to account ade-
quately for the potential endogeneity of payment-method
reforms.
Results
At the hospital level, our results indicate that patient-
based/casemix payment reduces the average length-of-
stay by approximately 4%, and the bed-occupancy rate by
5% (with no perceptible effect on inpatient admissions).
Fee-for-service methods, on the other hand, increase
admissions by almost 8%, and the bed-occupancy rate by
a similar magnitude. At the broader health-sector level,
both payment arrangements raise per-capita health
spending by a similar amount (approximately 20%), with
equally large effects on both public and private spending.
Finally, we do not find evidence that using fee-for-service
in preference to budgets has any effect on amenable mor-
tality. However, significantly negative effects on the death
rates for two causes - in addition to generally negative
point estimates for the remaining measures - are found
due to the introduction of patient-based methods.
Conclusion
Overall, our results provide evidence that patient-based/
casemix and fee-for-service hospital-payment methods
have different effects, both at the hospital level and for the
health sector as a whole. Both hospital-payment arrange-
ments increase the amount of resources going into the
health system (with potentially important distributional
consequences), yet patient-based/casemix systems seem
to do better in translating the additional resources into
improved population health.
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